

**JOINT FORCE TRANSFORMATION
TO FIGHT THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM**

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INTRODUCTION

When you're finished changing, you're finished.
— Benjamin Franklin¹

Since the end of the cold war, the geopolitical landscape of the world has changed dramatically. In contrast, the structure, roles, and missions of U.S. military forces are only now beginning to investigate the changes needed to both defend the continental United States and also support U.S. interests throughout the world.^{2,3,4} Terrorist activities, beginning most notably with the coordinated attacks of September 11, 2001, have ushered in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), which has renewed a sense of urgency towards transforming the military. In addition, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for Fiscal Years 2003-2007 has further driven the transformation effort within the Department of Defense (DOD). The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated recently in the November 2003 DOD *Joint Operations Concepts* (JopsC):

We do not know the true face of our next adversary or the exact method of engagement.... This uncertainty requires us to move away from our past threat-based view of the world and force deployment. We must change.⁵

The JOpsC makes the additional statement concerning the vital importance of military overseas transformation:

Joint Forces must be able to hand over one operation, reconstitute while remaining forward deployed for subsequent tasking, and undertake an entirely different military operation without extensive reliance on host-nation or overseas infrastructure.⁶

To successfully execute the GWOT, DOD must not only transform its Service components and what they bring to the fight; it must also change from a singular conventional mindset to a dual focus that facilitates a force structure that can meet both conventional and asymmetric threats to U.S. national security interests. This transition must also exploit technology and interagency capabilities to facilitate a synchronous, effects-based

approach across the full spectrum of conflict. This, in turn, is needed to assist in the development of political stability in highly volatile regions of the world.

The Current Geopolitical Environment

While the military has begun its transformation process, one must also look at the geopolitical context in which this transformation must occur. In the study *Future Directions for U.S. Military Overseas Presence*, the RAND Corporation offers a very good description of these geopolitical changes, and also identifies the tremendous uncertainty of their outcome:

The likelihood of great, continuing change in world affairs is due to the expectation that the individual building blocks of the international system all seem destined for major upheavals. For example, political values are changing in response to the discrediting of communism and to the emerging tug-of-war among democracy, nationalism, ethnicity, and Islamic theocracy. The global security system is changing as bipolarity gives way to a new but murky multipolarity in all three regions. Old powers are fading, but new ones are rising. A new, fluid geopolitics may be emerging that changes how the big powers, the medium powers, and the small powers relate to each other. The world economy is also changing in response to new technologies and market dynamics, but its destination is very unclear because prosperity is likely to be distributed unevenly. Military affairs are changing in response to new technologies, doctrines, and force structures. Global communications are changing in ways that allow for the instantaneous dissemination of information almost everywhere. Underlying these trends are even more fundamental changes. The nation-state is changing: Its authority appears to be eroding and transnational dynamics are becoming more prevalent. Equally important, society and culture are also changing in both the developed world and the underdeveloped world.⁷

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 also highlights an even more disturbing and growing geopolitical trend—that of a diffusion of traditional state actor power and military capabilities to nonstate actors:

The attacks against the U.S. Homeland in September 2001 demonstrate that terrorist groups possess both the motivations and capabilities to conduct devastating attacks on U.S. territory, citizens, and infrastructure. Often these groups have the support of state sponsors or enjoy sanctuary and protection of states, but some have the resources and capabilities to oper-

ate without state sponsorship. In addition, the rapid proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive (CBRNE) technology gives rise to the danger that future terrorist attacks might involve such weapons.⁸

Comprehending these geopolitical changes, their implications for the future structure and missions of the military, and their effect on joint operations is one the greatest challenges facing the United States today. In this context, it becomes clear that while strategic leaders must know the improved capabilities of the threat, operational leaders must develop a strategy to defeat it.

Overview

From the changing geopolitical landscape of the world and the implications for joint military forces, we move on to describe the evolving terrorist and asymmetric threat. Nonstate actors, including terrorist organizations, and the nation states that provide chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons to terrorists are an even greater threat that must be deterred or defeated. We then discuss force transformation in the context of current world situation and guidance, new mission requirements, and those components necessary for transformation. Next, we outline current military department transformation efforts and issues, and describe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coalition efforts having an impact on military transformation. After a discussion of the challenges of the interagency process, we conclude with a way ahead to bring together Service component transformation efforts in the joint operations arena.

THE THREAT

War is not an affair of chance. A great deal of knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to conduct it well.

– Frederick the Great, *Instructions for His Generals*, 1747⁹

Understanding the current and future threat capability is the first imperative in developing operational concepts and capabilities for the joint military forces. Just over a decade ago it was easy to identify the immediate threat to the United States as the monolithic communist bloc; however, the change in geopolitical landscape has allowed a predominance of terrorist activities, signifying a shift to a new type of threat. The National Security Strategy (NSS) describes this shift and the threat:

For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and equality. That great struggle is over...America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.¹⁰

The “New Warrior Class”

This threat was also described a decade ago as “The New Warrior Class”:

The soldiers of the United States Army are brilliantly prepared to defeat other soldiers. Unfortunately, the enemies we are likely to face through the rest of this decade and beyond will not be “soldiers,” with the disciplined modernity that term conveys in Euro-America, but “warriors”—erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order. Unlike soldiers, warriors do not play by our rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders they do not like. Warriors have always been around, but with the rise of professional soldieries their importance was eclipsed. Now, thanks to a unique confluence of a breaking empire, over cultivated Western consciences, and a worldwide cultural crisis, the warrior is back, as brutal as ever and distinctly better armed.¹¹

This “Warrior Class” has become the foundation of today’s terrorists and their activities, and has kept pace with the traditional militaries and their growth in easily obtainable capabilities.

Capabilities

Throughout the 1990s, the western world evolved and advanced in significant areas of technology and capability, with many of those advances now available commercially. One example is the advancement in information capabilities—in 1992 there were only 130 Web pages on the World Wide Web; however, by 2001 the number had grown to well over 8 billion Web pages.¹² The “Warrior Class” also evolved and advanced during this time, taking advantage of those commercially available capabilities without having to pay any developmental costs. An example of that evolution and opportunistic use of technology for terrorism is found in the al-Qaida network, which coordinates its operations in more than 60 countries through the use of cellular and satellite telephones, encrypted email, internet chat rooms, videotape and even CD-roms.¹³ This “Warrior Class” and the threat of which it forms the basis have become even more sophisticated in the past ten years, and have become larger, better financed, and better organized.

Today, terrorist networks operate globally and are attempting to further unite globally, exploiting the technology available.¹⁴ Terrorist organizations have developed their own version of an interagency community with a CIA-like covert force, having sleeper cells that operate in the United States and Europe.¹⁵ The terrorists have adapted well to this new geopolitical environment, and have even hidden the full extent of their advanced network and capabilities from the western world. With the global proliferation of CBRNE weapons of mass destruction, terrorist networks have now increased their capabilities and lethality to such a degree as to now be the number one threat to U.S. national security. The threat is not the global symmetrical threat of the previous century—it is a global asymmetrical threat involving several types of actors.

The Actors Involved

The newly emerging international threat is clearly a form of asymmetrical warfare, and the actors involved are not just the terrorist organizations and the countries that support terrorism. Countries providing monetary support and technology, especially the technology to develop CBRNE weapons, to terrorist organizations and countries that support terrorism must be assessed against the goals and objectives specified in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The extent of this is significant and thought provoking. For example, the book *Unrestricted Warfare*, written by senior colonels in the Chinese Army, states: “Asymmetrical warfare—terrorism, computer hacking, economic sabotage, assassination of U.S. citizens—is the Chinese military’s strategy to defeat the United States.”¹⁶ The book also contains the very alarming suggestion for Beijing to sell to those regimes supporting terrorism the necessary technology to make weapons of mass destruction as part of a strategy to degrade U.S. national power.¹⁷

The Bush Administration understands the asymmetric threat posed to U.S. national security: “Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia. Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.”¹⁸ The need for immediate transformation of the joint force to effectively execute the DOD-related activities in support of the Global War on Terrorism are well defined in the recent National Security Strategy:

To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U. S. forces. Before the war in

Afghanistan, that area was low on the list of major planning contingencies. Yet, in a very short time, we had to operate across the length and breadth of that remote nation, using every branch of the armed forces. We must prepare for more such deployments by developing assets such as remote sensing, long-range precision strike capabilities, and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces.¹⁹

Having determined the context and capabilities of the terrorist threat, as well as what is needed to win the war on terrorism, the next step is to determine the ways and means to defeat terrorist networks. The preponderance of the U.S. military force today is designed to fight large conventional wars, based mostly on military doctrine and tactics of the Cold War era. DOD must change from the Cold War era methodology into a flexible force capable of deterring and defeating terrorism, and preferably overseas before it reaches the shores of the United States.

JOINT FORCE TRANSFORMATION

Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions and its own peculiar preconceptions.

– Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832²⁰

President Bush, in a speech to the cadets at the Citadel, challenged the U.S. military to transform quickly in order to win the GWOT and shape the military for the future:

To win this war, we have to think differently. The enemy who appeared on September 11th seeks to evade our strength and constantly searches for our weaknesses. So America is required once again to change the way our military thinks and fights. And starting on October 7th, the enemy in Afghanistan got the first glimpses of a new American military that cannot, and will not, be evaded.... This combination—real-time intelligence, local allied forces, Special Forces, and precision air power—has really never been used before. The conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about the future of our military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-tank symposiums.... Preventing mass terror will be the responsibilities of Presidents far into the future. And this obligation sets three urgent and enduring priorities for America. The first priority is to speed the transformation of our military.²¹

Such a transformation must not be done just for the sake of the GWOT. Any transformation of the nation's defense must begin with a look at possible new mission requirements while also taking into account the U.S. national objectives in order to provide a force, specifically a joint force, capable of filling both roles.

New Missions Requirements

DOD civilian and military leadership seeks to structure and implement U.S. joint military forces in support of U.S. national objectives, identified in the QDR as follows: defend the United States; deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts—including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.²²

These national objectives form the basis for force planning. Specifically concerning the second objective, to “deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions,” the QDR describes where the transformed force should be applied, and notes that regional force tailoring is a key to force transformation:

DOD’s new planning construct calls for maintaining *regionally tailored forces* forward stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littorals, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia to assure allies and friends, counter coercion, and deter aggression against the United States, its forces, allies and friends.²³

For many years throughout the Cold War, the basic model for determining the missions and therefore, the force requirements, was the spectrum of conflict model. That model identified a full range of conflicts from the lower-violent but more likely peace-time presence, to show of force, use of force, limited war, global conventional war, and then to the least likely but much more violent theater and strategic nuclear war.²⁴ That

has changed little since the end of the Cold War, even though President George H.W. Bush emphasized a “portfolio of capabilities” and his successor President Clinton focused on lesser-level-of-violence missions.²⁵

As a result, it appears the joint force has had an ever-increasing number of missions added to its responsibilities in the past 15 years. However, missions such as these have always been routine peacetime responsibilities of U.S. military forces, as is evidenced by the following examples:

Intervention in Haiti in 1994 was conceptually similar in form if not in intent to that in 1915....[U.S. military has conducted] a noncombatant evacuation of over 260,000 Greeks and Armenians following the capture of Smyrna by Turkish troops...[and] Naval officers [have] served as governors of Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.²⁶

If anything is new concerning these missions, it is the media permitting more widespread and intense public awareness of the effects of these missions, and the corresponding sense of importance that policymakers have now attached to them.²⁷

Therefore, a “hierarchy of missions” concept and not the traditional spectrum of conflict model could be a better gauge for military transformation.²⁸ Such a hierarchy has been postulated, and consists of three categories: survival interests (survival of the nation, territorial integrity, economic security); vital interests (defense of treaty allies, defense of democratic and pivot states, deterrence or winning of regional conflicts); and value interests (peacemaking, prevention of internal conflict, peace operations).²⁹

Transformation Components

There have been many opportunities for U.S. military forces to transform throughout the history of America, and as a result several basic components of the transformation process have emerged. Therefore, for a successful transformation by today’s joint forces, the required components of transformation should include the following: a

new operational concept; a new doctrine and organization to execute the concept that increases fighting power; a new joint operational architecture to integrate the technologies of ground, naval, and air warfare; and a new approach to modernization, education, training, and readiness.³⁰

A New Operational Concept: Rapid Decisive Operations

Advances in available technology, the evolved threat capability, and the GWOT have taught the United States the reality that the military must transform. The joint force must become a force that is lighter and more responsive, capable of a quick strike on places such as a terrorist cell or a state-sponsored site of CBRNE weapons. As the military and interagency organizations contemplate transformation and begin the process, it is critical for them to establish a joint operational concept first before deciding how to design capabilities and restructure the forces.

In addition to direction given to the military Services, DOD has directed Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to develop a roadmap for transformation, and it is currently conducting experimentation and analytical efforts to identify and describe future war-fighting concepts, including how a joint force will fight.³¹ The elusive and adaptive enemy of today, and the one the nation can expect to encounter in the future, demands that the U.S. military move to emerging concepts capable of integrating transformed joint forces into a transformed joint operation. One such concept is Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO), which JFCOM is developing as a joint operations concept for future operations. One important aspect of RDO is the ability to synchronize military capabilities and efforts with the other elements of national power through the interagency community in order to achieve a combined military-political end state. Rapid decisive operations con-

sist of four mutually supporting characteristics: knowledge-centric warfare, effects-based operations, coherent jointness, and full networking.³²

Knowledge-centric operations give the U.S. military the ability to exploit technological advantages of future information systems to furnish enhanced situational knowledge of both enemy and friendly forces. Such advanced knowledge capability will enable lighter forces to more rapidly and decisively respond with the appropriate force when terrorists, or state actors supporting terrorism, threaten to attack.³³

Effects-Based Operations (EBO) are philosophical considerations of military and nonmilitary strategic effects desired to be effected on an enemy. The desired effect could be either physical or purely psychological. EBO is most effective when military actions are coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with the interagency and international communities in both planning and execution. Such coordinated, synchronized and integrated teamwork will create the synergy of second- and third-order effects with the goal to collapse the will and coherency of the enemy.³⁴

Designing joint forces and capabilities with interoperability as a prerequisite is inherently joint and a necessity. Interoperability of the legacy force will require extensive retrofit, but must be done at least to some extent. To be successful, future joint forces must begin with an integrated joint command and control system, interoperable combat systems, and a coherence of thought and action attainable through joint training and leader development. To achieve full coherence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, interoperability and collaboration must extend beyond the Services to interagency and multinational operations. In addition, coherently joint operations will require

the joint capability established at the combatant command level to be expanded and applied down through the operational or joint task force level.³⁵

Fully networked forces enable planners and operators to share knowledge, plan, decide, and act collaboratively and concurrently to simultaneously accomplish mission tasks. Situational knowledge shared among the joint forces increases the speed and precision of planning, which in turn increases the application of combat power. Fully networked forces develop seamless processes that further increase the speed and effectiveness of planning and execution. A fully networked team must also include the inter-agency and multinational partners when appropriate.³⁶

Effects-Based Operations, with its four mutually supporting characteristics, is the key to transforming joint operations. These four characteristics, when applied simultaneously, provide the synergy and capability for a lighter, more responsive force to attack elusive terrorist or state-sponsored sites of weapons of mass destruction with greater speed and precision. The secret to rapid EBO is the ability of national political, military, economic, and information elements to achieve multiple parallel effects across the entire theater of operations simultaneously, and to achieve them faster than the enemy can react. Advances in technology such as computer-based collaborative planning capabilities, smart precision weapons, global communications and global navigation have significantly increased the military's capability to act rapidly and simultaneously.³⁷

In framing the debate between threat-based and capabilities-based force as a basis for force transformation, the reality of the unimaginable was brought to the forefront for consideration by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The events of that day demonstrated the type of surprise terrorist adversaries could bring upon the nation or its mili-

military forces. Consistent with the tenets of Rapid Decisive Operations, a capabilities-based force would be best equipped to adapt quickly and decisively to such a surprise. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld states, “Instead of focusing on who our next adversary might be or where a war might occur, we must focus on how an adversary might fight—and develop new capabilities to deter and defeat that adversary....[W]e must plan for a world of new and different adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception and asymmetric weapons to achieve their objectives.”³⁸ To be effective in combating the new 21st century threats, the DOD then must

field forces that can fight and win against threats ranging from modern high-technology nation-state, with its complex infrastructure, to such non-state entities as terrorists, ethnic factions, religious radicals, and criminal cartels. These diverse and contradictory environments require flexible and versatile forces that can function effectively, with speed and precision, across the full range of military operations anywhere in the world.³⁹

CURRENT PLANS AND CHALLENGES

The problems of the world cannot possibly be solved by skeptics or cynics whose horizons are limited by the obvious realities. We need men who can dream of things that never were.

— John F. Kennedy, Address in Dublin, Ireland, 28 June 1963⁴⁰

Overcoming almost a half-century of warfare concepts designed to counter a monolithic foe is no easy task, and must be rooted in the planning process for each Service as well as for all of DOD. In late 2003, and in response to the current DPG, each of the military departments published transformation plans for its Service components to follow. These form the basis for individual Service transformation and shaping the future force, and are briefly summarized below. In addition to these transformation plans, there are challenges in the areas of command and control (C2), intelligence, and information

operations that must be addressed to bring all these capabilities together in the joint environment in support of the GWOT.

Service Transformation Plans

Each of the Services has developed transformation plans based on the DOD Transformation Planning Guidance, which specifies several terms of reference as principles to guide Service concept development in support of a joint operations concept.⁴¹ The Army has published a substantial Transformation Roadmap. While it is a rather comprehensive treatment of the Service's transformation approach, the document does identify three main transformation components: transformation of Army culture through leadership and adaptive cultures; transformation of process-risk adjudication using the Current to Future Force construct; and building of transformational capabilities to the Joint Force.⁴² Similarly, the Air Force has a substantial document, called the Transformation Flight Plan. This document describes the Air Force transformation strategy as one that will enhance joint warfighting; aggressively pursue innovation; create flexible, agile organizations; incorporate capabilities and effects-based planning and programming; develop “transformational” capabilities; and break out of industrial-age business processes.⁴³ The Naval Transformation Roadmap affects both the Navy and Marine Corps, and is planned to be carried out through the “interdependent and synergistic operational concepts of *Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing*,” integrated by the “single comprehensive maritime network” FORCEnet.⁴⁴

All three military departments plan to transform in a way to give the joint forces commander the Service-based capabilities needed to counter national threats. Since this

concept is just recently published, it will take some time to validate each of the Services' approach given the geopolitical landscape.

Command and Control (C2) Challenges

As military doctrine evolves during the war on terrorism and beyond, the lessons of history must not be forgotten. During United Nations Operations Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in Somalia, the tragic events of 3 October 1993, involving Task Force Ranger and the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) from the 10th Mountain Division, provide a good case study for the criticality of developing seamless command structures. Special Operations Forces, operating under a separate chain of command, were conducting small daylight raids to capture warlord Mohammed Aideed and his lieutenants. The QRF, under the command of U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSCOM), was not aware of Task Force Ranger's mission and consequently was unprepared to conduct extraction operations. This contributed to the tragic deaths of 18 rangers on 3 October 1993. The principle of unity of command was violated for operational security (OPSEC) and a number of other reasons.⁴⁵ The Pentagon has historically struggled to blend Special Operations Forces into joint campaigns. Their distinctive training, peculiar weaponry, unorthodox tactics, and culture of secrecy have typically led to complicated chain of command structures as noted above in the Somalia scenario.⁴⁶ With a renewed emphasis on Special Operations Forces in the war on terrorism and beyond, it becomes critical that special and conventional forces be more coordinated and synchronized to achieve success with minimal casualties.

Intelligence Challenges

A key to success for the interagency community and the transformed joint military in defeating terrorist organizations is a seamless intelligence network. Prior to 11 September 2001, the Bush administration had been planning indepth reviews of the U.S. intelligence system that constituted 13 different departments or agencies that provided intelligence. The terrorist attacks brought into sharp focus the nation's intelligence deficiencies: few contacts with foreign nationals who could infiltrate terrorist groups, a failure to communicate between government agencies, and a lack of linguists to decipher intercepted clues.⁴⁷ The culture of secrecy that exists in the U.S. intelligence community needs to be reduced to ensure that the operator who needs the intelligence can get it in a timely manner. There are signs of improvement in the Afghan campaign where a Special Forces commander said his captains and A Teams were getting a lot more information from the CIA than they had ever been given before.⁴⁸ A rapid and decisive force will only be effective if the intelligence professionals can give them the location in time and space of an elusive enemy.

The newly emerged enemy does not easily present itself as target for conventional or unconventional forces. There are minimal “observables” in this new war on terrorism where imagery and electronic intelligence (ELINT) become less valuable, and human intelligence (HUMINT) becomes the intelligence of choice. Unfortunately, “After the Cold War, the CIA substantially cut back on the number of overseas spies in its directorate of operations, according to lawmakers and intelligence experts. Those who remained often have had to assist U.S. military operations instead of focusing preemptively on areas where terrorism has flourished.”⁴⁹ Establishing positive military-to-military relations and

conducting combined military exercises (with interagency involvement) can set the conditions for seamless foreign intelligence and military cooperation.

The GWOT dictates the need for greater international intelligence cooperation. However, as important as it is to break down the seams in the U.S. intelligence community, it is equally important to identify and understand where the seams are in the international intelligence community and establish ways to work around them. Understanding the history and culture of a country can help identify where such seams may occur. For example:

In Germany, where the 9-11 plots were hatched, law enforcement is a loose patchwork. Fearful of creating another Gestapo, Hitler's secret state police, the Germans after World War II sharply restricted information sharing between local investigators and national prosecutors. These well intentioned safeguards may have stopped the Germans from connecting the dots: Marienstrasse 54, the apartment shared by chief hijacker Mohamed Atta and several other plotters, was actually under surveillance by German authorities. But the investigation went nowhere, and the investigation was dropped.⁵⁰

The above example demonstrates that the United States needs to have as much emphasis on working with foreign intelligence services as it does on reforming U.S. intelligence services to deter and defeat terrorist networks. The new global threat is more elusive and adaptive than ever before, and for U.S. forces to be effective in defeating or destroying terrorist networks, they will need a seamless intelligence network. Such a seamless intelligence network must include the interagency community, foreign intelligence services, and, above all else, improved human intelligence.

Information Operations Challenges

During the Cold War the U.S. interagency community had a very active Information Campaign (Office) to help control and broadcast the message of democracy and capitalism to the world.⁵¹ That office closed down after the Cold War but has now found

new life with the GWOT. In the Eisenhower Executive Office building next to the White House, a Coalition Information Center has been formed.⁵² Its emphasis has been on starting or creating the story instead of reacting to it. This is consistent with the trend throughout the interagency community of becoming more proactive, more preemptive, as opposed to reactive. One of its primary missions and messages is to make the case that the war on terrorism is not a battle of Christianity vs. Islam or West vs. East.⁵³ The Information Campaign must be synchronized with the other elements of national power. From the White House to the State Department, to U.S. allies, to commanders in military-to-military contact with the Afghans, the message must be consistent and easily communicated to be effective. Clearly communicating U.S. policy and intentions through the media, and diplomatic and military-to-military channels, is essential to reducing international enmity and possibly terrorist attacks against the United States.

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force structure is also transforming. The newly established NATO Response Force (NRF) is described as a force that is “designed to be a robust, high readiness, fully trained and certified force that is prepared to tackle the full spectrum of missions, including force.”⁵⁴ Achieving initial operational capability in October 2003, NRF’s final operating capability size will be 21,000 troops, having fighter aircraft, ships, vehicles, combat service support, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities, making it a high readiness force capable of deploying in five days and sustaining itself for 30 days.⁵⁵ Such a force packaging concept shows that even a bureaucratic multinational organization like NATO is making the transforma-

tion to a force capable of rapid decisive operations using a tailored force mix and such concepts as effects-based operations.

In addition to the plans, issues, and overall efforts in transforming the joint force just described, plus the efforts of a major treaty organization like NATO, one of the more critical pieces is the interagency community's contribution and interaction with the joint force in support of achieving overall national mission objectives.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Union gives strength.
– Aesop⁵⁶

The U.S. military will need to defeat more than one formidable enemy while fighting the GWOT, and perhaps the most challenging one will come from within its own ranks: the interagency process. This “friendly enemy,” which is critical to the successful prosecution of terrorists, can be a tangled mess of bureaucracy across unfamiliar lines and departments:

Other Federal agencies can see the ends, ways, and means differently than does the Department of Defense. Even though the ends may be agreed to by all (as they are in the counterdrug war), the ways and the means may differ from agency to agency. Distinct organizational cultures can inhibit cooperation among agencies. Commonly an agency employs resources in ways that run counter to other agencies’ cultures. What one agency views as “by the book,” another may see as “slow and bureaucratic”; “fast and loose” to one is “flexible and responsive” to another. Interagency participants should understand that agencies are often guided by their unique cultures (to include the Armed Forces of the United States) and that an appreciation of these cultural differences and of other agencies’ priorities, procedures, capabilities, and terminology will pay dividends during interagency coordination and execution.⁵⁷

There can be difficulty with interoperability among the several agencies including tactics, communications, command structures, cultural differences, and decision making. How-

ever, the military forces must learn how to exploit the capabilities of the many governmental agencies and operate alongside their counterparts to eliminate the worldwide insurgency.

Tactics

Traditional military roles call for the use of overwhelming firepower, e.g., aircraft, tanks, artillery, etc., to rapidly crush opposition forces. Although overwhelming firepower may sometimes be applicable in the GWOT, aircraft, tanks, and artillery arrayed for a frontal assault are rarely the best option. Moreover, one of the most difficult tasks of all may be to locate the enemy, perhaps by culling them from the local populace in nonwestern cultures around the world.

Using nonstandard tactics is a defining principle for terrorist organizations. Although the United States has concentrated a portion of its forces on defeating terrorism for more than 23 years, the transformation of a sizeable portion of the military to that type of fighting will be challenging. Terrorist organizations are nonstate actors, further complicating the efforts of the U.S. military to thwart their capabilities. Terrorists use variations of a defensive strategy, although one that is borderless, and thus give meaning to the worldwide nature of GWOT. Chasing these murderers around the world is a difficult enterprise, particularly when they blend easily into populations and rarely identify themselves as enemy combatants. In most cases, lines are blurred as to whether terrorist acts are considered criminal activity or acts of war. The U.S. military has not been trained to solve crimes and is many times easily frustrated by such an elusive enemy.

One way of preparing to defeat terrorism is to adopt a capabilities-based approach. "We put aside the threat-based model of the past and adopted a capabilities-

based approach—one that focuses less on who might threaten us or where, and more on how we might be threatened and what capabilities we will need to deter and defend against those threats.⁵⁸ The military has begun to embrace this process and identify the capabilities needed to prosecute the war on terror. From this view, it is clear that the military must focus on the capabilities needed for an asymmetrical, counterinsurgency type of war. In addition, there are many capabilities new to the military in the realm of homeland security that need to be addressed, such as securing critical infrastructure.

A Supporting Force

So how will the military transform to defeat this global terrorist war? The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, signed by President Bush in February 2003, poses a four-front war for the fight. The United States will *defeat* terrorist organizations by attacking their critical nodes, *deny* terrorists sponsorship and sanctuaries, *diminish* the conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and *defend* itself against future attacks.⁵⁹ What the policy statement means for the military is clear: these four fronts equate to new tactics and capabilities for the uniformed services.

The military will play a large role in each of these four areas. Tactically, the military must have the capability to locate the terrorists and then kill or capture them. In most scenarios, the military will rely heavily on the intelligence community for information about where terrorists are located simply so that they can get to the fight. Remote outposts, cave dwellings, and the like in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Indonesia, and other locations are not easily located. In most cases human intelligence will be needed to exploit the terrorists' networks in order to provide targeting data for the various cells.⁶⁰ Once the terrorist cells are located, the intelligence operatives must then pass the lead to

the military. They will probably not do so, and in many cases the military will play a backup or supporting role.

What is required could be a difficult shift in focus for military warfighters. Built from day one as dynamic, resourceful warriors who are capable of accomplishing any number of tasks, now the military may act in support of other agencies. This is particularly true in the homeland security arena where Presidential policy states that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official whose responsibilities include coordinating Federal resources for missions of military assistance to civil authorities (MACA).⁶¹ Therefore, MACA missions will always feature DOD forces acting in support of a designated lead Federal agency (LFA).

NORTHCOM

In response to the changing needs of the Department of Defense to defend the continental United States against future terrorist threats, the U.S. Northern Command, or NORTHCOM, was established in October 2002. NORTHCOM is headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and is the newest of the nine combatant commanders with regional responsibility for the defense of North America.

Technically, NORTHCOM has two roles in the GWOT: homeland defense and MACA. As a regional combatant commander, NORTHCOM's area of responsibility includes all of North America and adjacent coastal waters, including the Caribbean Sea region. Nearly every mission that NORTHCOM executes includes engagement in some level of the interagency process. Working closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), NORTHCOM must coordinate operations with a number of federal agencies and the Coast Guard. Activities such as critical infrastructure protection, securing

the nation's ports and airfields, etc. are new areas of defense that the military must train for. Although the military will become involved in MACA missions only when requested by the local first responders, the breadth of such operations can be intimidating for military planners. The range of operations spans everything from dealing with natural disasters to nuclear attack to assisting in the cleanup and investigation of the space shuttle *Columbia* mishap. These operations run the gamut of federal agencies and response plans. The federal response plan contains 12 emergency support functions, such as transportation, mass casualty response, and urban search and rescue, all of which have a role for the military.⁶² Executing real-world missions within the continental United States is itself a change of mindset for the military forces.

Whether the military is acting alongside or in support of intelligence community operatives, there is still much to work out. The intelligence community is notorious for “stove-piping” its products in the classic “competition against” instead of “competition with” scenario.⁶³ Great strides have been made in recent years; however, much work remains to be done. For example, the intelligence community has more than 15 large databases to try to sort out among themselves prior to filtering information to the field operatives and military fighters.⁶⁴ In addition, each of the 30-some federal agencies that now comprise the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have legacy, stove-piped information systems that will need to be integrated.

Doctrine and Planning

Navigating the murky waters of the interagency process will not be easy from a doctrinal standpoint either. The traditional “gung-ho” military way of doing business is at best unfamiliar, and at worst unwanted, in most other agencies. The military is tied to

a centralized control and decentralized execution methodology in which every warfighter always knows who the boss is and who is in charge of what operation.⁶⁵ Other federal agencies are not structured similarly, and in some cases are purposely structured to blur the chains of command. This can be exceptionally frustrating for the military members, and in some cases can lead to units' becoming completely ineffective.

The planning process for the military is clearly defined by a complex system of deliberate planning and crisis action planning. The military is experienced at planning for all manner of contingencies. This is not necessarily so for other federal agencies. Understanding the differences in planning methods, ability, and scope among the various other agencies is yet another hurdle that must be jumped for the military to fight effectively in the GWOT.

Perhaps the most difficult piece of this new strategy for the military will be its psychological aspect. Every professional warrior knows by now that the GWOT will be an extended campaign, in some cases likely to last throughout a Service member's career. Preparing mentally for sustained combat operations in remote locations is a difficult task for warfighters. In the current war there will be few if any classic battles. The commanders will likely never know where they stand in relation to winning. The U.S. soldiers will be placed in situations not normally encountered during combat operations, such as door-to-door fighting in populated urban areas, defending against all manner of improvised explosive devices, and similar enemy tactics.

In some of these scenarios, perhaps nonlethal force will be the best option. There have been instances in Iraq recently in which U.S. forces were attacked by an enemy who then quickly blends in with the civilian population only to have U.S. soldiers firing into

crowds and injuring or killing innocent civilians. Such activity will likely not win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi citizens from whom U.S. forces are attempting to gather support for the American ideal. In addition, if the military is called on to quell a civil disturbance or respond to a terrorist-related event in an urban environment within the United States, nonlethal force may be the best option. Another positive aspect of using nonlethal force is that afterwards the involved personnel will be available for interrogation and intelligence exploitation. This mindset of nonlethal fires is a revolutionary change for U.S. combatants, and it is not something that can be perfected in a short time.

The GWOT will demand a great deal from the military. Fighting the last war is the worst possible way for the military to go about planning and operating for this unconventional threat. A great many challenges face the military in their transformation to fight the present and future wars. Perhaps the most important challenge is to their ability to successfully work alongside their civilian partners. These partners bring an impressive capability to the table in the way of combining their respective pieces of America's defense structure together in an interagency process that covers all aspects of operations and planning. For the most part, this is foreign territory for military members. However, in its efforts to transform itself into an effective fighting force for the GWOT, the military must understand the interagency process and be able to exploit the awesome capabilities resident with it.

CONCLUSION

The commander's success will be measured more by his ability to lead than by his adherence to fixed notions.
– General Dwight D. Eisenhower⁶⁶

The GWOT and the Transition Planning Guidance have driven the military Services to develop transition plans for their forces to be used in the joint and multiagency fight against terrorism, the current major threat of this century. There have been many calls by leaders for transformation, and this is the first major step. The next, and equally important, step is to transform theater-level operation planning to effectively enact the ideas and goals found in national-level guidance and direction, make use of the Service plans, and integrate the efforts of multiple and diverse agencies, and even include coalition and treaty partner nations.

This is no easy task, and leadership must ensure that the foundational capabilities of U.S. military services are not sacrificed to solely address asymmetric threats to the United States. In transforming, the military Services must be able to meet both conventional and asymmetric threats to U.S. national security interests. As such, the joint integration aspect of theater operation planning must also be capable of doing both without sacrificing either. In support of this, there are some areas that must be developed to ensure the best possible joint theater operation use of the transformed military.

First, the U.S. military should adopt the joint operational concept of Rapid Decisive Operations and then use that concept as a basis for transforming joint theater operation planning. RDO has proven itself on the battlefields of Afghanistan, and most notably where Central Command's campaign became a testing ground for Air Force precision

targeting, reconnaissance, and command and control technologies, resulting in decreased sensor-to-shooter time.⁶⁷

Second, joint education in theater operation planning should begin to emphasize (and exercise) more of the intelligence, information operations, and overall C2 aspects. Joint education today does address these to some extent; however, much of the planning effort is in the traditional forces available, firepower available, flow to theater, basing, and such, with just a mention or two of these other critical aspects (most of which are assumed valid or operational throughout the duration of the exercise). The development of joint education to provide transformed theater planning is essential to preparing succeeding generations of planners capable of making the most of the military Services' transformation efforts. Such education can be performed through various avenues in the DOD; however, it all must be coordinated to ensure that the joint planner is truly a joint planner and not a transformed parochial Service proponent.

More coalition exercises using transformed joint theater planning concepts must be conducted. Although these can be difficult to schedule and even costly given today's budget constraints, there is a need to exercise with coalition and treaty partners using the transformed joint theater operation planning mentioned above. The benefits are twofold: it gives U.S. forces practice in what they are preaching, and it serves as a real-life validation, something not always possible with computer modeling or simulation.

Next, there need to be more exercises with U.S. interagency partners. This is the most difficult part, since the military is used to more structure than the normal interagency process embodies. However, there need to be increased efforts to include inter-

agency participation and even conduct exercises where the military is completely in the supporting role.

If the DOD does not see this cycle through, then it runs the risk of continuing to adhere to a fixed notion. In the last half of the past century, that notion involved static major war against a monolithic enemy. As this new century continues, DOD must ensure that it continues to be able to address both symmetric and asymmetric threats to the United States. If not, DOD and the military Services run the risk of adhering to another, equally stagnant fixed notion—the concept of transformation for the sake of transformation.

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.
— President George Washington⁶⁸

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⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 12.

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¹⁸ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, p. 5.

¹⁹ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, pp. 29-30.

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²² Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, p. 17.

²³ Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, p. 20.

²⁴ Tangredi, Sam J., "Assessing New Missions," *Transforming America's Military*, ed. Hans Binnendijk, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002, p. 10.

²⁵ Tangredi, pp. 10-11.

²⁶ Tangredi, p. 14.

²⁷ idem.

²⁸ idem.

²⁹ idem.

³⁰ Macgregor, Douglas A., “Transforming Jointly,” *Transforming America’s Military*, ed. Hans Binnendijk, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002, p. 225.

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³² U.S. Joint Forces Command, *A Concept For Rapid Decisive Operations*, White Paper 2002, p. 7.

³³ idem.

³⁴ idem.

³⁵ idem.

³⁶ idem.

³⁷ Myers, Gene, “Effects Based Operations: The Heart of Rapid Decisive Operations,” *A Common Perspective*, October 2001, p. 15.

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⁴⁰ Fitton, p. 70.

⁴¹ Rumsfeld, *Transformation Planning Guidance*, p. 29.

⁴² Department of the Army, pp. ix-xi.

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⁴⁴ Department of the Navy, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁵ Allard, Kenneth, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995, pp. 55-61.

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⁵⁶ Fitton, p. 39.

⁵⁷ Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Vol I, 9 October 1996, p. I-9.

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⁶⁶ Fitton, p. 3.

⁶⁷ Rolfsen, Bruce, "On-The-Job Testing," *Air Force Times*, 21 January 2002, p. 12.

⁶⁸ Wintle, Justin, editor, *The Dictionary of War Quotations*, New York: The Free Press, Macmillan Inc., 1989, p. 65.

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